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This survey of Florida labor law connects with the preceding survey,'
and covers Florida Supreme Court decisions, significant Florida Circuit
Court decisions, federal decisions and N.L.R.B. rulings of local interest,
and changes made in the statutory law by the 1955 legislature.
In addition to the cases concerning organized labor, we have covered
those where an individual employment contract was in issue.
FLORIDA LAW
a) Unlawful employer conduct
Unlike the federal (Taft-Hartley) act, the corresponding Florida Labor
Organizations Act does not use the word "unfair" in condemning specific
employer activities, rather, the somewhat stronger term "unlawful" is
applied." Employers arc forbidden to blacklist employees or former
employees,;' or to interfere4 with their guaranteed right of self-organization.5
Unfortunately, there is no state Labor Board or similar governmental
agency to administer the provisions of the Florida Act.0 Thus, those func-
tions usually performed in other states by administrative machinery, such
as the investigation of complaints, supervision of representation elections,
issuance of ceasc-and-desist orders, and so on, are, in Florida, either thrust
upon the courts or are not performed at all.
Prior to the period covered by this survey, the Florida Supreme Court
had, strangely enough, never decided a case in which the unlawfulness
of an employer's conduct (as defined by the Act) was squarely in issue.
Only a few cases may be found in which the court, by dicta only, indicated
its views as to the legality of certain employer activities.7
Editor-in-Chief, Miami Law Quarterly.
1. 8 MItN1i L.Q. 246 (1953). The survey period covered by this article extends
fions August 1, 1953 to August 1, 1955 (66 So.2d through 81 So.2d, 207 F.2d through
221 F.2d and 346 U.S. through 348 U.S.).
2. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(1) through (13)(1953).
3. FLA. STAT'. § 833.02 (1953).
4. F.. STAT. § 447.09(l1)(1953).
5. FI.. STAT. § 447.03 (1953).
6. This shortcoming in the Florida law has been commented upon by both legal
scholars and labor leaders. See Craniling, The Development of Florida Labor Law, 7
NIIAMI L. Q. 188 (1953); Snowden, Labor Law, 8 MIAMI L. Q. 246 (1954); plus the
bitter commentary by George Meany, President of the American Federation of Labor,
in his July 18 (1955) address to the convention of the New York State Federation of
l abor. NI. Nleany's speech was introduced into the Congressional Record by Senator
Lehman of New York, speaking on the Senate floor on July 20, 1955. See 101 CoNc.
Rix. 9474 (daily ed. July 20, 1955), also notes 101, 102 infra,
7. Local Union No. 519 of United Ass'n of Journeymen etc., v Robertson, 44
So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1950); Miami Laundry Co. v, Laundry Linen etc,, Union, 41 So.2d
305 (Fla. 1949).
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Thus, the Supreme Court started off with a relatively clean slate
when confronted with Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union Y, Boca
Raton Club,8 the only case decided during this survey period where an
employer was charged with unlawful conduct. Though the events which
brought about the dispute were quite complicated, and extended over a
period of several weeks, they may be summarized briefly as follows. The
Boca Raton Club is a resort hotel in a relatively isolated location, which,
while in operation during the tourist season, furnishes living accommodations
to its employees. Failure of the hotel and the union to settle certain
grievances9 was, according to the union, followed by a strike. The hotel
thereupon allegedly posted an eviction notice 0 ordering the "not working"
employees to leave their quarters, arranged for police to prevent access
to their rooms, and caused several of the workers to be arrested and fined
for criminal trespass.
The case is almost as interesting a puzzle in civil procedure as it is
a study in labor law. The suit was initiated by the union, which sued in
equity on its own behalf, and on behalf of its members as such and as
individual employees. Judging from the frequent criticism expressed by
the court" the complaint was evidently not well drawn; after setting forth
the foregoing allegations, the complaint concluded with what might be
called a "hypothetical" prayer for relief, as follows:
. . [Tihat if unfair practices are being committed by said employer,
a decree to that effect be entered and the rights of the parties
set forth in said decree; that said acts of said employer which
are unfair practices . . . be enjoined and injunction without notice
be entered . . . . [Italics supplied.]
The Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, White, J., denied all
temporary relief, and, on the defendant's motion, dismissed the bill for
8. 73 So.2d 867 (1954).
9. The grievances were, as usual, over wages and hours, plus the alleged failure
of the hotel to promptly remit tips paid to the management.
10. A copy of the notice was introduced into evidence, which read, in part:
Important Notice-All Dining Room and Bar Employees Not Working
Are Hereby Notified to Vacate the Boca Raton lte] and Club Premises
as of Today, March 5, 1953 ....
In addition, the notice contained an offer by the management to discuss
grievances with any employee, and an offer of guaranteed employment for the remainder
of the season to those employees who wished to resume work
11. We quote from the opinion:
The allegations of the original bill were indeed "vague and indefinite"
as the Chancellor observed. . . .
The Chancellor was understandably perplexed at the nature of the relief
requested . , .
In effect the Chancellor was asked to analyze the case and rule upon
anything he considered appropriate ...
In such a case, it is sometimes difficult to recall and apply the distinction
between inexpert pleading and insufficient pleading. . .
Indeed, both the original and amended complaint herein are of such a
character that we can understand the considerations which must have
occurred to the Chancellor in granting defendant's motion to dismiss....
. . , counsel will find that time spent in setting out a case briefly and
in readily comprehensible form will pay dividends . . .
210 AIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
failure to state an actionable claim. However, the plaintiff was given leave
to amend.
'le amcnded complaint was supplemented by new allegations, based
on events which had occurred since the first hearing, and which, in the
words of the Supreme Court, "represented a complete change in the
picture before the court." By this time, the employer had met with the
union representatives, and had, according to the amended bill, concluded
some sort of ,an agreement with them. 2 Injunction against the "continuous
retraction" of this agreement was sought, and another hypothetical prayer
for relief made:1'
I[That the courtl . . .construe the sworn allegations herein, the
exhibits attached, and the testimony presented, and ascertain to
what extent the defendant has coinitted unfair labor practices
.... That if mifair labor practices have been committed, and are
being committed ...a permanent injunction be entered ordering
the defendant to cease and desist further unfair practices . . ,
and that plaintiffs have damages . . . and that the court allow
such other relief as in equity may be just. [Italics supplied.]
Again, the Circuit Court denied relief, and dismissed the bill.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court, Hobson, J., affirmed the
lower court decision, specifically on the grounds that the plaintiff's bill
was insufficient in law to support the relief sought.
While the case was thus decided on matters of pleading,1 4 the Supreme
Court discussed the labor law problems at considerable length, and, by
very strong dicta, revealed its views on those issues which were, un-
fortunately, otherwise kept in the background.
The court first of all considered the events which had occurred prior
to the execution of the agreement between the hotel and the union, and
rcviewcd the action of the Circuit Court in dismissing the union's com-
plaint. Such action was proper, said the court, as far as the union was
12. Unfortunately, the court did not discuss the agreement in detail, nor gave
any indication as to its nature or contents. The outcome of a suit of this kind might,
atcording to established principles of labor law, very well depend on tile establishment
(if the agreement as a valid collective bargaining contract, with its resultant quasi-legisla-
tive effect. See Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
210 EM2d 623 (1954), aff'd, 348 U.S. 437 (1955). The opinions of both the Court
(f Appeals and the United States Supreme Court in this case are highlighted by a
penetrating analysis of the legal theory of collective bargaining agreements. See also
Warns. The Nature of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 3 MIAMr L.Q. 235 (1948).
13, 73 So.2d at 869.
14. Again, we quote the court (73 So.2d at 870):
'To entitle the plaintiff to relief, it was necessary that a case for such
relief be not only sufficiently proved, but sufficiently pleaded as well . , .
As the case is pleaded, moreover, it is indeed multifarious, as the Chancellor
observed, both as to parties and to claims for relief . ..we do hold that
tile allegations of the amended complaint are insufficient to support such
relief here . ..
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concerned, but was error as to the employees." That is to say, the rights
sought to be enforced were partly personal to the employees.16 The court
went on to make the square holding that it was error for the chancellor
not to grant a temporary injunction against the eviction proceedings."
The defendant hotel had contended that the employees were, in effect,
engaged in a sit-down strike, in violation of Section 447.09(9) of the
Florida Statutes,'$ but the court would not accept this view. While it
was true that the striking employees were occupying their employer's
property, the court pointed out that they were not occupying their actual
work area and, for the time being at least, had no other place to go. The
court conceded, of course, that the employer would be entitled to evict
the employees if the strike continued for any appreciable length of time.19
The court then considered the amended complaint, in which the
"continuous retraction" of the strike-settlement agreement was alleged,
and sought to be enjoined. Also sought, it will be recalled, were damages,
and an injunction against whatever unfair labor practices the court might
find had been committed. The prayer for an injunction against a "con-
tinuous retraction" amounted, said the court, to a suit for specific per-
formance of the contract, and held that insufficient facts had been alleged
to support such a suit.29  Damages, the court continued, would be im-
possible to award because all the employees were not similarly situated,
and each should have sued in his own name, or at least in separate classes.
An injunction against "unfair labor practices" would be too broad, said
the court, and rather acidly pointed out that the Florida Statutes are them-
selves a "continuing injunction" against these practices.
Thus was the appeal disposed of. It is, of course, unfortunate that
the issues were not more skilfully framed by opposing counsel so that the
court could have squarely decided the case on its merits rather than on
the insurmountable flaws in the pleadings. It does appear, however, that
the court went considerably out of its way to be fair to the litigants them-
selves, both in analyzing the facts and in indicating its view of such legal
questions as might have been properly raised.
15. 73 So.2d at 870.
16. Miami Laundry Co. v. Laundry, Linen, etc., Union, 41 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1949),
and Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So.2d 194
(1946) were cited by the court to support this view.
17. 73 So.2d at 871. The court viewed the eviction proceedings as a coercive
measure in direct violation of FLA. STAT. § 447.09(11), which forbids an employer to
". .. coerce or intimidate any employee in the enjoyment of his legal rights . . ." The
court cited, with approval, L. J. Williams Lumber Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 635 (1951); W. T.
Carter Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 2020 (1950); Great Western Mushroom Co., 27 N.L.R.B. 352
(1940); Alaska Juneau Mining Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 125 (1936); all of which held that
eviction or the threat of eviction may constitute unlawful coercion under either the
Taft-Hartley or Wagner Act.
18. This section reads. "It shall be unlavful for any person ... to seize or occupy
property unlawfully during the existence of a labor dispute."
19. 73 So.2d at 872.
24. Ibid.
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b) Unlawful union conduct
Bv wav of introduction we shall summarize the Florida law con-
cerning the legality of various union activities, up to the time of this
survey. The Florida Labor Organizations Act-' prohibits certain employee
activities, whether committed individually or collectively. Excessive union
men bership dues may not be charged;"- each labor organization must keep
accurate financial records for the inspection of its members; -3 union members
who join the United States armed forces may not be penalized for de-
linquent dues; 4 the employees' "right of franchise" may not be impaired; -"
interference with union elections is forbidden;20 no strike may be con-
ducted unless authorized by a majority vote of the employces,27 to be
conducted by secret ballot;281 employees may not seize or occupy property
unlawfully during a labor dispute;"'- jurisdictional strikes may not be con-
ducted; 0 coercion of employees, intimidation of their families, or picketing
of their homes is prohibited,31 as is picketing beyond the area of the
industry within which the labor dispute arises;32 no picketing may be
conducted with force or violence, or in such a way as to block ingress
and egress to and from buildings. 33  Two statutory provisions34 which
attempted to impose strict qualifications on union business agents, and
to extract a registration fee from labor unions, were held unconstitutional
by the United States Supreme Court.3 5 The Florida Constitution contains
a "right to work" provision, 6 which in effect, prohibits the closed shop in
Florida. As explained previously, 37 there is no state administrative
machinery to put these laws into effect.
21. FLA. STAT. §§ 447.01 - 447.15 (1953).
22. FLA. STAT. § 447.05 (1953).
23. FLA. SrAT. § 447.07 (1953)
24. FLA. STAT. § 447.08 (1953
25. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(1) (19 3); the "right of franchise" is further defined as:
.. . the right of an employee to make complaint, file charges, give in-
formation or testimony concerning the violations of this chapter, or the
petitioning to his union regarding any grievance or violations of law to
any public officials, and his right of free petition, lawful assemblage and
free speech.
26. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(2) 1953).
27. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(3) (1953).
28. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(4) 1953).
29. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(9) 1953).
30. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(10) (1953
31. FLA. STAT, § 447.09(11 (1953.
32. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(12 (19531.
33. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(13 (1953).
34. FLA. STAT. §§ 447.04, 47.06(1953).
35. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538(1945), rehearing denied, 326 U.S. 804 (1945).
36. FLA. CONST. D.R. § 12, "..... The right of persons to work shall not be
denied or abridged on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor union,
or labor organization; provided that this clause shall not be construed to deny or abridge
the right of employees by and through a labor organization or labor union to bargain
collectively with their employer."
37. See note 6 supra.
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'fhe foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions have been inter-
preted on twelve1 8 occasions by the Florida Supreme Court, and in general,
the court has substantially supported their literal construction. An exception
appeared in three cases.,, where the court refused to declare picketing
illegal when the "majority vote" rule40 was not complied with, reasoning
that picketing in itself does not constitute a strike. Violent picketing,
4'
or peaceful picketing for an unlawful purpose 42 may properly be enjoined.
With this background of established Florida law in mind, let us now
consider the cases which arose during this survey period in which the
Florida Supreme Court passed upon the allegedly unlawful acts of labor
unions or their members.
Miami Federation of Musicians v. Wompearce4' presented two prob-
lems for the Supreme Court's consideration: first, where to draw the line
between a primary and a secondary boycott;4- second, how much may a
38. Int'l Typographical Union v. Ormerod, 59 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1952); Hotel &
Restaurant Employees etc., Union AFL v. Cothron, 59 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1952); iten-
baugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 52 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1951); Stonaris v. Certain Picketers,
46 So.2d 387 (Fla. 1950); Local Union No. 519 of United Ass'n of Journeymen etc.,
v. Robertson, 44 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1950); Johnson v. White Swan Laundry, 41 So.2d
874 (Fla. 1949); Moore v. City Dry Cleaners and Laundry, 41 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1949);
Miami Laundry Co. v. Laundry Linen etc., Union, 41 So.2d 305 (Fla.1949); Whitehead
v. Miami Laundry Co., 160 Fla. 667, 36 So.2d 382 (1948); Miami Water Works
Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So.2d 194 (1946); Hill v. State, 155 Fla.
245, 19 So.2d 857, reversed. 325 U.S. 538 (1945) rehearing denied, 326 U.S. 804 (1945);
Pittman v. Nix, 152 Fla. 378, I1 So.2d 791 (1943).
39. Johnson v. White Swan Laundry, supra note 38; Moore v. City Dry Cleaners
and Laundry, supra note 38; Whitehead v. Miami Laundry Co., suPra note 38. See the
discussion of these cases by Gramling, The Development of Florida Labor Law 7 MIAN1
L.Q. 188 (1953g.
40. FLA. STAT. § 447-09(3)(1953).
41. Moore v. City Dry Cleaners, su ra note 38.
42. Local Union No. 519 of United Ass'n of Journeymen etc., v Robertson, 44
So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950).
43. 76 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1954).
44. The Florida Supreme Court, in its previous decisions, has indicated its views
on secondary action by dicta only. See, Paramount Enterprises v. Mitchell, 104 Fla.
407, 140 So. 328 (1932) where the court said (104 Fla. at 408, 140 So. at 330):
When the coercion extends to customers of the person or persons boycotted
and attempts to coerce them on pain of being boycotted themselves
unless they refrain from dealing with the persons boycotted it is called a
"secondary boycott."
The federal (Taft-Ilartley) law is, of course, much more explicit:
Sec. 8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization [to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of] (A) forcing or requiring
any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer
organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person ....
A typical interpretation of this section by the National Labor Relations Board may
be found in United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 81 N L.R.B. 802
(1949), order enforced 184 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950) where the Board said:
. . . two factors must combine - (1) the alleged activities must have
as an object the forcing or requiring any employer, inter alia, to cease
using the products of any manufacturer or to cease doing business with
any person; and (2) the activities must constitute inducement and en-
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court of equity interfere with a labor union's internal affairs. In this
case, the plaintiff owned a theatre in Miami Beach and had leased it,
from time to time, to various show promoters. The shows, apparently,
did not turn out too well, for over a period of time the establishment
earned itself such a reputation with the members of the local musicians
union (many of whom complained that their seasonal contracts had been
broken upon default of the promoters) that it was placed on the union's
"defaulter's list," a sort of private credit-rating prepared by the union to
apprise its members of poor credit risks. It is the union's policy not to
approve contracts between its members and employers placed on the list.
The present suit arose when Vompearce subleased the theatre to
a new promoter. The sublessee found that, although he personally owed
no money to the local union, he had been placed on the defaulter's list
along with his ill-fated predecessors. Thus, he was unable to hire union
musicians, and was hamstrung in his operation of the theatre. The pro-
moter's efforts to reach a settlement with the union were unsuccessful;
the union declined to remove his name from the list until all previous
claims had been paid. The plaintiff thereupon brought suit in the Circuit
Court to enjoin the union from keeping the theatre on the defaulter's list.
In the Circuit Court, the plaintiff was successful and a decree was
issued declaring that:
... [Tlhe defendants are attempting to blacklist a valuable building
because the owners and lessees thereof refuse to pay a claim which
is not owned by them . . . the aforementioned conduct of the
defendant union amounts, in effect, to an unlawful secondary boy-
cott and to an unlawful coercion, unlawful intimidation, unlawful
interference with the free use of property, and an unlawful
attempted extraction of money for no consideration ....
The decree enjoined the union from keeping the theatre on its
defaulter's list, and from refusing to permit union musicians to work
there.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed this decree on two grounds.
First, it held that the union action was not a secondary boycott, 5 but
merely a "withholding of services" to extract concessions from the owner
and lessee, and was, thus, really "primary." Two cases were cited to support
couragement of employees in the course of their employment within the
meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(a). '[he absence of either factor will defeat
the charges thereunder.
The accumulated body of federal law regarding secondary action is quite substantial,
as might be expected, and it seems unfortunate that the Florida Supreme Court did
not draw more extensively from this body of well-seasoned law. See also, FoRsoscr, A
'l'rEATISz ON LABOR LAw(1953), § 277.
45. 76 So.2d at 302. ,
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this view.16 Second, the court held that use of a defaulter's list was
part of the union's internal affairs, and, on the basis of prior authority,"
not subject to court interference. Let us analyze each of these points.
Although the Florida Supreme Court had not previously decided any
case in which secondary action was a square issue,48 it was certainly able
to draw upon a wealth of authority from other jurisdictions4 9 (especially
federal),50 A succinct definition of secondary action was chosen by the
Florida court,5t
-I . pressure . . . brought to bear against a third party with whom
there is no dispute in order to coerce his support in obtaining
favorable settlement of a dispute with another.
When this definition is applied to the facts of the Wornpearce case it is
indeed difficult to understand the court's conclusion. The sublessee was
a third party to the dispute between the union and the prior lessees.
Although the prior lessees had presumably disappeared from the picture
and were not themselves likely to make a settlement with the union as a
result of the boycott, the desired result (i.e., payment of their bills by
the new sublessee) was a perfectly "favorable settlement" as far as the union
was concerned. The court appears to have overlooked the implications of
this decision. It has given judicial approval to a process whereby a union
(or anyone ?) may force an innocent party to make good the debts of
another "or else!"
Consider next the second basis for the court's holding, namely, that
the Circuit Court should not have interfered with the "internal affairs"
of the union by ordering it to remove the sublessee's name from the
defaulter's list. Again we are faced with a meager body of established
Florida law (two cases)5 2 for the purpose of comparison and analysis. In
46. Paramount Enterprises v. Mitchell, 104 Fla, 407, 140 So. 328 (1932) (at-
tempt by picketers to intimidate customers of a theatre held not to be a secondary
boycott); Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941) (a strike
called solely because the employer used recorded rather than "live" music held unlaw-
ful). The analogy between these two cases and the Wompearce case seems remote
indeed.
47. Jelton-Delke Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907); Harper
v. Hoercherl, 153 Fla. 29, 14 So.2d 179 (1943), from which the court quoted with
approval:
Membership in such organizations being non-compulsory . . . courts have
generally left the settlement of their internal affairs to the organization, to
be conformed by its members so long as they chose to retain their affilia-
tion with the organization.
48. See note 44 supra.
49. In addition to Florida, thirteen states have enacted laws governing secondary
a:tion (Alabama, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,
Missouri, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, and Utah).
50. See note 44 suor.
51. The court relied on Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) and on the
tieatise, I TELLER, LABOR DISPUTEs 455 (1940).
52. Paramount Enterprises v. Mitchell, (supra) Note 46; plus the strong dicta in
Stanton v. Harris, 152 Fla. 736, 13 So.2d 17 (1943)(dicta).
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general, Florida has adhered to the rule adopted in other jurisdictions, 3
that, ordinarily, a court will not exert its power to settle disputes occurring
when a union attempts to put its own rules into effect. The rationale is
that a union is a voluntary association, a sort of "country club," whose
internal affairs should be governed solely by its own members.5 ' This
view, however, does not take into account that, for the workers in many
trades, union membership is not only not voluntary, but is a prerequisite to
working at all, or that the constitutions of such unions often disenfranchise
the substantial majority of their members. ' 5 This point should not, perhaps,
be belabored, because the "internal affairs" argument seems inapplicable
to the Wompearce case. The effect of the defaulter's list was decidedly
external, both as to the plaintiff and his sublessec, and, indirectly, to the
public as a whole.
The vice in this decision is that the court failed to recognize the
musician's union in Miami, with its affiliates throughout the country, as
a monopoly of the most cohesive and absolute kind,56 and that its internal
affairs should not be governed by the same judicial standards as those
applied to a country club. The situation is not analogous to the usual
business dispute, where, if one party does not like the way the other runs
his affairs, he can freely "take his business elsewhere." Rather, it is as
though a utility were to refuse to provide service to a tenant because the
previous tenant had not paid his bill.
True, the issue of monopoly was not raised in this case, though Florida
has, by statute, 7 placed restrictions upon monopolistic practices, similar to
those enacted by the federal government. 5  If the time-honored immunity
53. E.g., Mayo v. Great Lakes Greyhound Lines, 333 Mich. 203, 52 N. W. 665
(1952); Hickman v. Cline,-Nev.-,279 P.2d 662 (1955); Dakchovolous v. Ernst, 282
App. Div. 1101, 126 N.Y.S.2d 534, (3d Dep't 1953); Bires v. Barney,-Ore.-,277 P.2d
751 (1954).
54. 76 So.2d at 302.
55. For an excellent (though rather strongly worded) discussion of this problem
see Valie, A Bill of Rights for the Union Alan, Readers Digest, Jan. 1955, p. 33. This
article quotes extensively from the constitutions of certain unions and shows that, by the
use of "joker" clauses, the rank-and-file union members are given little, if anything to
say about the running of their organization. Tihe author hastened to point out, of
course, that the constitutions of conservative unions usually provide for a representative
internal administration.
56. It will be recalled that in 1942 the musician's union was able to stop all
production of phonograph records in the United States. An antitrust action was brought
against the union, but the United States Supreme Court held that the union's action
was protected by the Clayton Act (see note 59 infra) and by the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-
Injunction Act 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 115 (1952); United States v.
American Federation of Musicians, 318 U.S. 741 (1943). The union received unsym-
pathetic Congressional attention when, in 1946, the Lea (or "Anti-Petrillo") Act was
passed, making it unlawful to coerce radio stations into hiring unneeded musicians or to
exact payment for the manufacture or use of recorded material; 60 STAT. 89 (1946), 47
U.S.C. § 506 (1952). See Van de Water, The Secondary Boycott Provisions of Taft-
Hartley: Their Potential Influence on Make-Work Activities, 28 So. CALIF. L. REv. 33
(1954).
57. FLA. STAT. §§ 542.01 -542.12(1953).
58. E.g., the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §§ I - 37
(1952).
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of labor unions from anti-trust laws 0 could be overcome in Florida, situa-
tions similar to the Wompearce case would seldom arise. The language6"
of the Florida Act would seem applicable to the activities of the union
in this case, particularly because there is no indication that unions are
exempted from its provisions.
Three closely related cases are Treasure Inc. v. Hotel and Restaurant
Employees Union, Local 133 AFL,6' Sax Enterprises v. Hotel Employees
Union, Local 255, AFL, 2 and Boca Raton Club v. Hotel Employees Union,
Local 255, AFL63  They arose from the recent efforts of the Hotel
Employees Union to organize the workers in the leading Miami and Miami
Beach hotels, - a situation we will discuss in detail later.
The Treasure case was heard in the Circuit Court (Dade County)
before Judge Cannon, who first granted a temporary injunction against
the picketing of the plaintiff's hotel, based on the following allegation:
. . . [Tihat the picketing was for the purpose of coercing
[the plaintiff] . . . to sign a contract with the Union as its
authorized bargaining representative . . . so that the Union would
be able to use such contract to compel his employees to become
members of the Union .... [Italics added].
After further proceedings, the judge dissolved the temporary injunction,
stating that, even though the allegations had been established to his
satisfaction,
. . . [S]o Iong as said picketing is conducted in a peaceful fashion,
and is for a legal purpose . . . the purpose of said picketing, or
the reason why the defendants are engaged in said picketing is
wholly immaterial ....
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower
court's decree must be based upon specific findings as to the legality of
the purpose for the picketing. 4  The court would not go as far as to
59. The Clayton Act. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1952) specifically
exempts labor organizations from federal antitrust laws.
60. FLA. STAT. § 542.05 reads thus:
. . . Any person who shall or may become engaged in any combination of
capital, skill or acts by two or more finns, corporations or associations of
persons or of either two or more of them, for either, any or all of the
following purposes:
(1) To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce or aids to
commerce, or to create or carry out restrictions in the full and free pursuit
of any business . . . shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty
dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, and by imprisonment in the
penitentiary for not less than one nor more than ten years ....
61. 72 So.2d 670 (Fla. 1954).
62. 80 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1955).
63. 80 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1955).
64. 80 So.2d at 681. It will be recalled that peaceful picketing for an unlawful
purpose was held properly enjoined in Local Union No. 519 of United Ass'n of Journey-
men etc., v. Robertson, 44 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950). Under Federal law, the same prin-
ciple was applied in International Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 533 (1950); International
Broth rhood of Teamsters v. Hlanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Hughes v. Superior Court,
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bold that the purpose had, iii effect, been "found" by the Chancellor
when he expressed his belief that the purpose was as alleged by the plaintiff.
However, the Supreme Court dropped a fairly broad hint as to the expected
final outcome by mentioning Miami Typographical Union v. Ormerod,a
where picketing for the same purpose (i.e., to coerce the employer into
signing a contract ini which the union is made the exclusive bargaining
representative, so that the union can use the contract to compel the
employees to join) was held unlawful and properly enjoined.
Sax Enterprises arose from a similar action, brought by the hotel to
enjoin picketing allegedly for the same purpose as in the Treasure case.
The Circuit Court, on application for a temporary injunction, declined
to issue one because, it held, it could not determine whether the picketing
was for an unlawful purpose (admittedly the key issue) until the union
had filed its answer. The employer brought certiorari and the Supreme
Court, Hobson, J., reversed the Circuit Court order, stating, "With no
other evidence to the contrary, the Chancellor had no alternative other
than to accept as true the sworn allegations of the complaint . .. ."
As in the Treasure case, these allegations, when accepted as true,
would bring the union's conduct squarely within the interdiction of Miami
Typographical Union v. Ormerod.Y°
The last case in this group, Boca Raton Club v. Hotel Employees Union,
Local 255, AFL, 7 was consolidated in the Circuit Court with similar
actions brought against the union by several other hotels. Precisely the
same sequence of events occurred in the Circuit Court as in the Sax
Enter prise- case, above, with no temporary injunction issued. The Supreme
Court, in a very brief opinion, reversed and remanded to the Circuit Court
with directions to issue a temporary injunction, and specifically cited the
Sax Enterprise case as authority.
A case of some significance was International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
etc. v. Miami Retail Grocers."" The Florida Supreme Court held that an
injunction could properly be issued by the Circuit Court (Dade County)
to prevent picketing where the controversy was within federal jurisdiction,
but where the union had not been properly certified by an election among
the employees.Y°
339 U.S. 460 (1950); Ciboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Company, 336 U.S. 490
(1949); Carpenters and Joiner's Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); See also
Cregory, Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Union and Employer Conduct,
49 Micti. L. REV. (1950), and FOaKOSCH, A i'BtEiucsE ON LABOR LAw (1953) § 199.
65. 61 So.2d 763 (Fla. 1952), noted in 7 MXAhIn L.Q. 434 (1953).
66. Ibid.
67. 80 So.Zd 681 (Fla. 1955).
68. 76 So.2d 491 (Fla. 1954).
69. The Florida Supreme Court decision does not reveal the facts as fully as we
have them stated above, but the reader may find the details in the Circuit Court file,
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Finally, International Brotherhood of Electrical Vorkers v. OikleT0
raised no question of substantive labor law, but merely concerned the
sufficiency of the evidence in a suit, brought by a union mcmber against
the union, for alleged violation of the union by-laws.
c) The telephone strike
On March 14, 1955, upon the expiration of the contract between
the Southern Bell Telephone Company and the Communication Workers
of America, a strike extending over several states7' followed. The workers
in Florida were represented by Local 3107, whose head office is in Miami.
In Florida, as in other states, the strike was accompanied by numerous
acts of violence, some severe and others trivial,72 and, as usual, each side
accused the other as the perpetrator.
Four incidents (not all of which involved violence) were followed by
significant legal action and are of interest here.
The "812" injunction suit. After the strike bad been in progress for
a month or so, members of the union discovered that, by dialing the number
"812" from Miami-area telephones, the caller would hear a recorded message
about the strike, apparently prepared by telephone company officials. The
message began with the words "Message to all supervisors . . ." and com-
mented upon various acts of vandalism committed against company property
Miami Retail Grocers v. Int'l Union of Tcamsters, etc., case no. 173669-E (Circuit
Court, Dade County, Oct. 26, 1954).
70. 77 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1955).
71. Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Tennessee.
72. The Southern Bell Telephone Company reported that in the Dade County
area, some 20,000 telephones were put out of order, at one time or another, by cable-
cutting (the company sought to enjoin the union from allegedly committing these and
other acts of vandalism in its unsuccessful Circuit Court suit. No individuals were
piosecuted).
There was a mysterious fire and a dynamiting incident at two isolated switchboard
installations, but these were not followed by legal proceedings of any sort. Two corn-
plaints were filed against telephone company supervisors, in Coral Gables, for allegedly
driving company trucks into picket lines in a violent manner. Judge Sutton (of the
City of Coral Cables) dismissed both cases.
In Miami Springs pickets were "buzzed" by a mysterious automobile, driven,
it appears, by a dwarf who was later found to have no connection with either the
union or the telephone company, but who bad injected himself into the dispute purely
on his own initiative. The police apprehended him and he was found guilty of reckless
driving.
A "fire hose" incident took place on the evening of April 23, outside the telephone
company main office building in downtown Miami, following a meeting of the union
members. It is not clear from the conflicting accounts as to the exact sequence of
events leading up to the incident, but it is universally agreed that a first-class fracas
ensued, involving some forty policemen, a contingent from the fire department (with
five hoses), seventy non-strikers, and an unknown number of strikers and bystanders.
There was also the "name-calling" case in Coral Gables (see text), and six dis-
o:derlv conduct charges brought against individual pickets (only one picket was con-
victed).
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in the Miami area.73  The union promptly brought suit 74 to enjoin the
company from using the language in the message, on the grounds that it
was: ". . . intimidating to the workers, false, insulting, and calculated to
cause violence .... " The suit was successful to the extent that the Circuit
Court in Dade County, Holt, J., enjoined75 the company from using the
language in the last sentence of the message, referring to the strikers as
"terrorist, vandals and jailbirds."
Thereafter, the company prepared other recordings, which were changed
from time to timc during the course of the strike, but which, of course,
avoided the offending words.
The injunction suit against alleged violent picketing and vandalism.
The telephone company, in its answer to the so-called "812" injunction
suit, asked, by way of counterclaim, for injunctive relief against the union.
The counterclaim set forth in great detail the activities allegedly com-
mitted by the union, including mass picketing, the blocking of entrances
to telephone company buildings, the use of abusive and threatening language
against non-strikers and bystanders, assaults of various kinds, and vandalism.
73. The recorded message said:
Message to all supervisors, A wave of vandalism swept over the Southwest
section when at least forty-two cables were cut interrupting service to
9000 subscribers. We cannot help but wonder what is going through the
minds of those striking employees who are not responsible for these
crimes-not against the telephone company but against the public, your
friends, and neighbors. Now is the time for striking employees to make
a decision whether or not they will join other right-thinking people, or
remain on the same team with terrorist vandals and jailbirds.
74. Communication Workers of America, CIO v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Company, case no. 178497-A (Circuit Court, Dade County, April 14, 1955).
75. Judge Iolt issued his temporary restraining order on April 15, 1955. His
order did not indicate its legal basis, and it is difficult to conceive a valid one under
the established principles of constitutional law as to freedom of speech. Probably the
best summation of these principles is to be found in Justice Holmes' opinion, Schwenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), where the "clear and present danger" rule was
first enunciated. See 10 MiAmui L.Q. 37 (1955).
A closely analagous situation to that before Judge lHolt was presented to the United
States Supreme Court in Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943),
where it appeared that pickets told prospective customers that the cafeteria served "bad
food" and that by patronizing it "they were aiding the cause of Fascism." The Supreme
Court held that " ., . to use loose language and undefined slogans that are part of
the conventional give-and-take in our economic and political controversies-like 'unfair'
and 'fascist'-is not to falsify facts .... " and was therefore not subject to state
injunction.
In Moore v. City Dry Cleaners, 41 So.2d 865 (FLA. 1944), the court said (at
page 873):
. ..we know of no lawful authority tinder which a court of equity may
proceed to enjoin a free discussion of the facts surrounding such labor
difficulty, even though the things said may prove to be unfavorable to
the industrial or business establishment toward which the statements are
directed. . . . In the absence of an express situation plainly requiring
reasonable public regulation in the interest of human life and safety, the
right [§ 13 FLA. Co NsT. D.R.j may not be denied or abridged.
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An appropriate court order was sought, based in part, on the provisions
of the Florida Labor Organizations Act.70
The Circuit Court denied the relief sought, holding that there was
insufficient proof of the activities complained of, and that the court did
not wish to take over the ordinary law-enforcement duties of the Miami
police.
The Coral Gables name-calling case. During the picketing of the
Coral Gables telephone company office, a picket was arrested and charged
with the violation of Ordinance 666, Chapter 2, Sections 2 and 3 of the
City of Coral Gables 8 in that lie called a non-striking telephone company
cnployee a "scab." The arrest was coiccdedly made as a "test casei"T
following similar name-calling incidents brought to the attention of the
Coral Gables police. Before trial, the city dropped the charge of violating
Section 3, and proceeded on the theory that the word "scab" was
"... offensive language calculated to provoke a breach of the peace .... "
The opposing sides80 introduced various legal and dictionary definitions of
76. I"LA. S'rAT. 447,09(13)(1953):
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to engage in picketing by force
and violence, or to picket in any such manner as to prevent ingress and
egress to and from any premises, or to picket other than in a reasonable
and peaceful manner.
77. Communication Workers of America, CIO v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Company, case no. 178497-A (Circuit Court, Dade County, opinion and
order dated April 27, 1955). The opinion reads, in part, as follows:
This court is ever reluctant to intrude itself into matters of controversy
which are purely economic, unless the public peace is imminently and
seriously threatened, and injury and damage may result to persons and
property unless court action be had. I do not find such to e the case
here .... The law enforcement agencies are in my opinion sufficient to
properly police this strike. . . the burden [is] on the defendant company
to prove that the union and its members are not picketing peacefully, but
are indulging in violence contrary to the law of the state. The defendant
company has not carried this burden ...
78. Section 2 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful in the City to wilfully disturb the peace of other
persons by violence, tumultuous or offensive conduct or carriage or by
profane, obscene, or offensive language, calculated to provoke a breach of
the peace or by assaulting, striking, or fighting any person or for any
reason to permit such conduct on or upon any premises owned or possessed
by him and which is under such person's management or control so that
other person's are disturbed thereby. Any person violating any of the
provisions of this Section upon conviction thereof shall be guilty of
disturbing the peace.
Section 3 reads (in part):
It shall be unlawful in the City for any person to make, aid, countenance
or assist in making any improper noise, riot, disturbance or breach of tile
peace; or to collect in a group or crowd for any unlawful purpose to the
annoyance or disturbance of other persons . . . or to aid or abet in any
fight, quarrel, or other disturbance
79. Coral Gables v. 'Walton, case no. 15691 (Municipal Court. Coral Gables,
April 8, 1955).
80. The defendant was, of course, represented by counsel, but the City Attorney
was absent at the trial. lis function was taken over by the judge himself, a procedure
which, according to the judge's remarks, is customary in that court. Thew iudge had
also prepared the charge and warrant. The defendant's motion for change of venue
and disqualification of the court was denied.
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the word, and cited cases8' in which courts of other jurisdictions have
interpreted it. The court, Brown, J., found the defendant guilty, and
remarked that:
The use of the word "scab" as a desif nation of a human being,
in the opinion of this Court, is one o the most opprobrious and
insulting statements in the English language when used in a time
of strike. . . . [Tlhe use of such a word at such a time, as a
strike in our area, could tend to a total break-down, possibly, of
law enforcement.
The defendant was fined $50.00 or 25 days in jail, which sentence
the court immediately suspended.
Appellate history. The Florida Supreme Court did not review any
of the legal proceedings brought about by the telephone strike, although
appellate review was sought up to the time of the strike settlement. This
may be regretted by legal scholars, but was doubtless welcomed by the
parties themselves, who filed stipulations of dismissal of all pending actions
as part of their settlement agreement.
d) The hotel strike
Litigation in the Florida courts. The Miami and Miami Beach hotel
strike began officially on April 13, 1955, a date which will probably become
a "Bastille Day" in the annals of Florida labor litigation. According to
union officials, the strike was called following the refusal of twenty-two
hotels to bargain collectively with the union. The hotel representatives,
in reply, claim that the union does not represent a majority of the
employees, that according to Section 447.09(3) of the Florida Statutes82
the strike was unlawful unless authorized by a majority vote of the em-
ployees, and that without such a majority vote the hotels are under no
duty to bargain.
When the strike began, the hotels promptly sought to enjoin picketing
in a series of twenty-two separate Circuit Court suits, alleging further that
the picketing was for an unlawful purpose, namely, to coerce the manage-
ment of each hotel to sign a contract designating the union as the exclusive
bargaining representative, so that the contract could be used to force
individual employees to join the union.83
81. United States v. Taliafero, 290 Fed. 214 (W.D. Va. 1922); Guerin v. State,
209 Ark. 1082, 193 S.W.2d 997 (1946); Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping
Machine Co., v. Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, 185 N.Y.S. 95 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
82. This section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . To participate in any strike,
walkout, or cessation of work or continuation thereof without te same
being authorized by a majority vote of the employees to be governed
thereby; provided, that this shall not prohibit any person from terminating
his employment of his own volition.
See Kanner and Corcoran, Florida Employment Peace Stafute-Compelting Union
Recognition, 4 MIAMI L. Q. 161 (1950).
83. See notes 61, 62, 63 supra and the related text for further explanation of
this issue.
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At this point, unfortunately, the dispute ran into procedural detours.
Before the union's attorneys had filed an answer, preliminary hearings were
held to determine whether or not the court should issue a temporary
injunction against the picketing. Denial of the temporary injunction was
followed by the plaintiff's bringing certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court
in eight of the suits,8' urging that such denial was error. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and remanded the cases with directions to enter
the temporary injunctions sought.s5
To avoid unnecessary litigation, counsel for both sides then agreed
to proceed with six80 of the twenty-two cases, the others to be held in
abeyance pending final outcome of the six. After further hearings, the
Circuit Court dissolved all the temporary injunctions against picketing,
whereupon counsel for the hotels sought supersedeas from the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court granted supersedeas 8 and directed that its
ruling was to have the effect of restoring the temporary injunction against
picketing. Thus, with one exception, 0 all picketing of the affected Miami
Beach hotels was enjoined, pending a final decision by the Florida Supreme
Court.
A sideline skirmish to the main battle developed in the San Marino
hotel case.90 Here the Circuit Judge, in an attempt to settle the issue
as to whether or not the union actually represented a majority of the
employees, had ordered an election to be conducted under court super.
vision. Picketing was enjoined in the meantime. To test the legality of
84. The eight suits were: Boca Raton Club v. Hotel Employees Union, Local
255, AFL, 80 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1955)(with which five of the Circuit Court suits were
consolidated on appeal); Sax Enterprises v. Hotel Employees Union, Local 255, AFL,
80 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1955); and Treasure Inc., v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees
Union, Local 255, AFL, 80 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1955).
85. See notes 61, 62, 63 supra, and the related text for further details.
86. The six plaintiffs were Boca Raton Club, Inc., Sorrento Hotel Corp., Harry
Levy et al (Sherry Frontenac Hotel), Leevlands Corporation, Monte Carlo Inc,, and
the 2500 Collins Avenue Corporation. The defendant in each case was the Hotel
Employees Union, Local 255, AFL,
87. Following the final decision by the Florida Supreme Court as to these six
cases, the defeated party will probably proceed in the Circuit Court with the remaining
suits, accepting, almost as a matter of course, an adverse judgment on each. Then,
following similarly unsuccessful appeals to the Supreme Court of Florida, the de-
feated party will be in a position to seek review of all suits by the Supreme Court of
the United States. Considering the importance of the strike, both nationally and
locally, it seems likely that this course will be followed. If the United States Supreme
Court does review the hotel cases, it seems almost inevitable that it will be confronted
with a new problem in the "free speech" aspects of picketing, i.e., to what extent does
the Florida Supreme Court decision conflict with those decisions of the United States
Supreme Court which have held picketing to be protected (with certain qualifications)
by the Fourteenth Amendment. A restatement of the United States Supreme Court's
position on this vexed question would be indeed welcome.
88, This ruling had not appeared, at press time, in either the official or unofficial
reporters.
89, The exception was the Versailles Hotel, which, for some reason, had not
taken legal proceedings to enjoin the picketing.
90. Thomas Jefferson, Inc., v. Hotel Employees Union, Local 255, AFL. 81
So.2d 731 (Fla. 1955).
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this proccdure, the hotel filed a notice of appeal in the Circuit Court,
and applied to that court for a stay of the portion of the decree ordering
the election. The Circuit Court granted a stay as to the entire decree,
which, of course, meant that picketing could be resumed. On certiorari,
the Supreme Court held that the Chancellor should have granted the partial
stay requested by the hotel, and, undoubtedly to the chagrin of the union,
so ordered.
It is interesting to observe at this point that, due to the procedure
followed by counsel for the hotels (i.e., petitioning for certiorari and super-
scdcas from the Circuit Court interlocutory orders), no final Circuit Court
decree was entered in any of the suits. Final review of the hotel cases by
the Supreme Court of Florida was secured when counsel for the hotels
petitioned for certiorari directed to the Circuit Court's dissolution of the
temporary injunction against picketing.
Trhe long awaited Supreme Court decision'" caine on October 19
when the high court granted certiorari and quashed the latest Circuit Court
orders. In spite of the many issues raised by each side, only two were
considered by the court, namely, ". . . whether (1) the respondent union
complied with the prerequisites to lawful picketing outlined in the Sax
case, . . . and (2) whether the picketing was for a lawful or unlawful
purpose . .. ."
To understand the court's holding as to issue (1) it is necessary to
reexamine the "prerequisites" to lawful picketing referred to in the Sax
case (see note 62 supra and the related text). There it was said, by dicta
only,
-92
. I I In order for such picketing to be lawful, the union must
establish that the employees have chosen it as their representative
... and the labor organization must also inform the employer
of the object to be accomplished by the picketing and afford to
the employer a fair opportunity to engage in negotiations.
Iere, the court held that, since the Circuit Court proceedings did not
establish that the union was properly chosen by the workers as their
representative, the union was not able to provide a fair opportunity for
the employer to engage in negotiations with them as an authorized bargain-
ing agent. Hence, the picketing was held to be:!'-
91. Boca 10atou Club, Inc., %. Hotel Employees Union, Local 255, AFL, 83
So.2d 11 (Fla. 1955) (case no's 26,197, 26,198, 26,199, 26,200, 26,201, 26,202,
Supreme Court of Florida, October 19, 1955). The suits filed by the six plaintiffs
listed in note 86 supra were consolidated in this appeal.
92. The court was, at this point, faced with an "apparent conflict" betwccn ithe
dicta in the Sax case, "fit order for such picketing to be lawful, the union miust establish
thlat the employees have chosen it as their representative . .. and must also inform
the employer of the object to be accomplished . . . - and that in Hotel and Restaurant
1%'mplovccs etc. Union %. Cothron, 59 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1952). "There is no rule . . .
which requires a notice to the employer of the reasons for an impending strike as a
perequisite to picketing . . ." The court reconciled the contradiction by holding that,
although no rule demanded such prerequisites to lawful picketing, 'fa'ir dealing and
s ,itd public policy demand them.
92a. 83 So.2d. at 16.
LABOR LAW
I .. the unlawful use of economic pressure to coerce the petitioners
into negotiations with an alleged agent who failed and refused as
required by law and just dealing timely and appropriately to estab-
lish his authority. Hence the picketing is for an unlawful purpose
. . [Italics added]
This last sentence, italicized above, indicates that the Supreme Court
did not in fact consider issues (1) and (2) to be severable, as the early
portion of its opinion would lead one to believe. The court, in effect,
settled issue (2) (i.e. illegality of the purpose of the picketing) in its
deliberation of issue (1). For good measure, however, the court further
held that the picketing was ". . . for the obvious purpose of forcing the
employers to cause their employees to designate the union as their bargain-
ing agent and perhaps to join the union .... "1" and thus unlawful under
the doctrine of Miami Typographical Union v. Ormerod, (see note 65 supra
and the related text.
N.L.R.B. jurisdiction. While both parties to the hotel dispute were
busily seeking such remedies as might be afforded by the Florida courts,
the Hotel Employees Union filed a petition 3 with the Regional Director
of the N.L.R.B., at Atlanta, Georgia, for certification as the bargaining
representative of the hotel employees. The Board dismissed the petition
on July 1, 1955, relying on the precedent established by Hotel Association of
St. Louis,"4 and reaffirmed in Virgin Isles Hotel,a where the Board held
that Congress evidently did not intend federal labor laws to control hotels.
The union promptly filed a request for review of this ruling, on July
12, 1955, before the N.L.R.B. in Washington. Opposing briefs were filed
by the American Hotel Association, all hotel members of the Miami Beach
Hotel Association, and by the Hotel Employees Uniony 6  The union, as
petitioner, contended that the hotel industry (nation-wide) grosses seven
and one half billion dollars per year, and employs one-half a million per-
sons, "all in the chain or flow of commerce," thus justifying federal inter-
vention. Further, the union contended, the N.L.R.B. had previously refused
to consider hotel disputes on the grounds of "policy" rather than on an
actual lack of jurisdiction. Facts and figures97 were introduced by the
union to support its theory that the Miami Beach hotels were engaged in
interstate commerce. In addition, evil results had followed the Board's
92b. Ibid.
93. N.L.R.B. Docket No. 10-RC-3135 (Aug. 9, 1955).
94. 92 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1951).
95. 110 N.L.R.B. 558 (1954).
96. See note 93 sutrd.
97. The brief presented by the union, among other things, stated:
I)uring the year ending September, 1954, the four county area includ.
ing Miami and southeast Florida had 2,500,000 visitors, (the greatest num-
ber of whom were accommodated by the hotel industry) who spelt
47,600,000 visitor days and $513,000,000. Of this amount. 5376.000.000
was spent in Dade County (Miami-Miami Beach) alone. [his represents
one-third of all spending in this county. $235,000,000 was spent in the
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failure to assert jurisdiction over hotels, the union alleged, such as blacklisting
of employees, the use of "labor spies," and stalemate strikes. The union,
in its brief, also vigorously attacked the Florida labor laws for their alleged
ineffectiveness, and commented bitterly upon the decisions handed down
by the Florida Circuit Courts, and by the Florida Supreme Court. It
should ibc noted, parenthetically, that, up to this time, the Florida Supreme
Court had merely decided such relatively minor issues as had bcen raised
on petition for certiorari or supersedcas,i$ and that the court had not
decided any hotel case on its merits.
flie brief of the American Hotel Association, in its answer, pointed
out that the Association is in no sense an employer of the hotel workers,
but is merely a trade association composed of the individual hotels and was
thus not a proper party to the suit. For good measure, however, the Asso-
ciation set forth several reasons why the Board should not reverse its
established policy of refusing to enter the field of hotel disputes. Historically,
the Association asserted, the N.L.R.B. had never entertained such disputes,
even in the pro-labor Wagner Act days. Moreover, Senate debates, indica-
tive of similar Congressional intent at the time of the enactment of
the Taft-Hartley Act, were cited for persuasion.90 The Fair Labor Standards
Miami Beach area alone. This is equivalent to two and one-half times the
spending of the residents of Mkliamni Beach.
The hotel industry in Miami Beach has more than 30,000 units,
employs approximately 12,000 people in all categories, and received for
the year ending September, 1954, in excess of $71,000,000 for hotel lodging
from visitors from outside the state of Florida. These hotels also received
in excess of $27,000,000 for food from these visitors. Thus the hotel
industry of Miami Beach received over $100,000,000 in revenue from
tourists moving in the chain of commerce. Bureau of Economic Research,
University of Aiarni.
The tourist industry of Miami and Miami Beach represents the leading
industry of the area and produces more than the income of the next two
leading industries (Miami Daily News, 3/16/1955 . . . ). In 1949,
when the tourist trade in the Greater Miami area was only $243,000,000
as compared with $376,000,000 in 1954, the income of the next leading
industry (airline operations and repairs) was only $105,000,000 and
income from all manufacturing was only $45,000,000; fruit and vegetable
growing produced only $13,700,000 in total income.
In addition, the hotel industry of Miami Beach is closely allied to all
types of interstate transportation systems. During the year ending Sep-
tember, 1954, the airlines alone transported over 1,200,000 tourists to
the Greater Miami area, the greatest number of these people being
destined for accommodations in the hotels of the employer association
herein.
... . Eastern Airlines . . . transported over 25,000 persons and received
revenue in excess of $28,000,000, National Airlines transported in excess
of 23,000 persons with revenue in excess of $25,000,000. Delta Airlines
[receivedl . . . in excess of a $5,700,000 revenue.98. ce notes 61, 62, 63 supra, and the related text.
99. In particular, the following &statement by Senator Taft, made during
the debate of August 30, 1949, 95 Covr. Rirc. 12463, 12515 (1949):
A hotel performs its service within four walls. It ships nothing into
commerce. It produces no goods for commerce. In my opinion the
Act was never intended to cover the hotel industry ...
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Act,100 the Association further argued, exempts hotels, and thus furnishes
collateral evidence of the intent of Congress not to regulate the activities
of hotels.
Finally, the Miami Beach Hotel Association, in its brief, alleged that
the union was conducting its activities for an illegal purpose (i.e., to force
the hotels to sign "union contracts" and then use these contracts to compel
the employees to join the union) and thus should not be entitled to
"equitable treatment" by the N.L.R.B. The status of the Miami Beach
Hotel Association was shown to be similar to that of the American Hotel
Association (i.e., not that of an employer). Also, the brief contained a
review of the existing Florida labor law, plus the assertion that under this
law, workers are guaranteed the same rights and privileges as under federal
law. The brief concluded with a history of N.L.R.B. policy toward hotels,
and argued that, because of their predominantly local economic significance,
hotels should not be subject to federal jurisdiction.
The refusal of the Regional Board in Atlanta to entertain the Miami
Beach Hotel strike was quickly followed by a blistering speech by George
Meany, President of the American Federation of Labor, before the con-
vention of the New York State Federation of Labor in Buffalo, New York,
on July 18.101 Subsequently Mr. Meany's speech was introduced into the
Congressional Record' 02 by Senator Lehman of New York. Mr. Lehman
also introduced a letter 03 he had written to the chairman of the N.L.R.B.,
urging that the Board assert jurisdiction. Mr. Lehman finally read into
100. 52 SrAT. 1060 (1938) as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1952).
101. Mr. Meany stated, among other things:
for those who work for a living in the hotels in Miami and Miami
Beach, there is plenty of misery in this "paradise" where the law of the
jungle still prevails. . . . Injunctions [against peaceful picketing) were
based on a provision in the misnamed Florida State "Right-to-Work"
law, whose real purpose is to wreck unions. . . The joker in the law
is that it provides no machinery for conducting employee elections to
determine collective bargaining representatives. . . . The union was forced
to turn for relief to the National Labor Relations Board, which adminis-
ters what was left of the original Wagner Act by the Taft-Hartley Act
.. . Rights have already been denied to them by a one.sided and repressive
State law. Is the Federal Government also going to slam its doors in the
face of these exploited workers?
102. 101 CoNrG. REO. 9774 (daily ed. July 20, 1955).
103. The letter was written on July 20, 1955, and reads, in part, as follows:
There is no question in my mind that the employees of the Miami Beach
hotels are, in the broad construction, engaged in an industry involved in
interstate commerce. . . . Should it prove necessary to enact legislation
requiring the Board to take jurisdiction in such cases, 1 shall be inclined
to introduce such legislation. It seems to me, however, that whatever
the glaring faults in the National Labor Relations Act-and there are
many-it certainly gives the Board adequate authority to take jurisdiction
in this matter.
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the Record a proposed bill' 0 ' which would compel the National Relations
Board to take jurisdiction over such hotel disputes."--
However, on August 26 the National Labor Relations Board, in a three-
to-two split dismissed the union's petition "... on the ground that it would
not effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction over hotels .... ,10,
The Board's decision is even more significant in view of the settled weight
of authority,I' 7 that the Board has virtually unlimited discretion as to
whether or not it will intervene in a particular dispute, regardless of its
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause?0 8
Counsel for the union, nevertheless, have announced plans to file a
mandamus suit to compel the National Labor Relations Board to enter
the dispute1 09
c) Miscellaneous cases
Federal preemption. A case which plunged the Florida Supreme Court
into the controversial problems which have arisen from federal preemption
of state power was Perez v. Triflletti."0  The suit was brought by a
majority of the employees to enjoin a minority union from picketing the
employer's premises, allegedly with violence. The Circuit Court (Dade
County) issued a final injunction against the picketing, and the defendants
appealed on the ground that, due to federal jurisdiction over their contro-
versy under the Taft-Hartley Act, the Circuit Court was without power
to grant relief.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decree, and, in its opinion, set forth
a concise review and analysis of the existing law, as pronounced by the
104. he Bill (S. 2651) was ordered to be printed into the Congressional Record,
as follows:
Be it enacted, etc., 'That section 14 of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, is amended by adding at the end thereof a new sub-
section as follows:
"(c) Nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize the Board
to decline to exercise jurisdiction over any labor dispute solely by reason
of the fact that the employer in such dispute is the operator, of one or
more hotels."
105. Ibid.
106. At press time, the Board's ruling has not yet appeared in the N.L.R.B. advance
sheets, but has been reported in the CCII Labor Law Reporter, at 53,170. Member
Murdock dissented in accordance with his dissent in the St. Louis Hotel case (note 94
supra). Chairman Farmer felt that the Board should consider taking "limited" jurisdic-
tion over hotels.
107. Tbis doctrine was established in I. E. Stone Lumber Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 627
(1948); Cousins Tractor Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 857 (1947); S & R Baking Co., 65 N.L.R.B.
35i (1946); Lacey Milling Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 914 (1943) and has never been squarely
challenged in the courts. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trade
Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951)(dicta). See also The N.L.R.B. under Republican
Administration, 55 COL. L. REv. 852, 853 (19551.
108. For a recent discussion see Sullivan, "Affecting Interstate Commerce": Cover-
age of National Labor Relations Act, 1955 LAw FoRuMi 191 (1955).
109. Miami llerald, Oct. 21, 1955, Sec. B, p.], col. 7-8.
110. 74 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1954).
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United States Supreme Court."' Actually, it was not at all clear that
this particular controversy so affected interstate commerce as to merit
federal intervention, and, had the court so chosen, it could have probably
thus disposed of the case. However, the court assumed, for the purposes
of argument, that federal jurisdiction might have been invoked, and pro-
(ceded. When picketing is accompanied by violence, the court pointed
out, state courts have not been precluded from acting to maintain law
atnd order-in spite of concurrent federal jurisdiction. The court quoted
with approval from Garner v. Teamster's Local 776,112 in which it was
said: 13
We have held that the state may still exercise 'its historic powers
over such traditional local matters as public safety and order. .. .'
Thus, since violence was the basis for the Circuit Court injunction, its
decree was upheld.
Individual employment contracts. Two cases arose in which the
Florida Supreme Court decided questions of law arising from an individual
employment contract. United Loan Corporation v. Weddle 14 concerned
the validity of an agreement made by a loan company manager not to
compete, directly or indirectly, with the company for a period of two
years after the termination of his employment.",5 The manager resigned,
and promptly went to work for a nearby competitor. Suit was brought in
the Circuit Court (Hillsborough County) to enjoin the breach of the
contract, but the injunction was denied on the authority of Love v. Miami
111. Federal preemption of state power by the Taft-llartley Act (and by its
piedecessor, the Wagner Act) has been a subject of much discusison by legal scholars.
See FORKOsCI, A IREATISE ON LABOR LAW § 205 (1953); Smith, Taft-Hartley Act and
State Jurisdiction, 46 Mien. L. REv. 593 (1948); Ratner, Problems of Federal-State
Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, 3 LABOR L. J. 750 (1952) (cited by the court in this
case). 'lie court explained the development of the federal law in recent years as high-
lighted by the following leading cases: Gamer v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485
(1953) (state court could not enjoin peaceful picketing where the dispute was under
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board); United Construction \Vorkers
v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (employer may recover tort
damages from a union in a state court for unfair practices under the Taft-Hartley Act);
International Union AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245
(1949) (state labor board may enjoin frequent unannounced work stoppages, despite
concurrent federal jurisdiction). The Florida Supreme Court's conclusion that the state
may properly intervene to preserve law and order is amply supported by the cases cited.
A recent re-affirmation of these principles may be found in the recent case, Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955), and by dicta in Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. Richman Brothers, 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
112. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
113. Id. at 488.
114. 77 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1955).
115. The significant portion of the contract read:
[the defendant] further agrees that for a period of two years after the
termination of his employment for any reason that he will not engage in any
way directly or indirectly in any business competitive with the company's
nor solicit in any other way or manner work for and assist any competi-
tive business in the city of Tampa, Florida, or within fifteen miles of
the city limits of said city as these limits exist on the date of this
agreement.
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Laundry, ', a case in which the Florida Supreme Court denied specific
performance of a similar contract between several truck drivers and their
employer.
In a four-to-three split, the Supreme Court affirmed the United Loan
decision, without opinion. Justice Drew, however, filed a dissenting opinion
in which he set forth, at some length, the facts of the case and the reasons
for his dissent. He believed, in essence, that there is a basic distinction
to be made between the Love and the United Loan cases, namely, that
while it may be against public policy to enforce such a contract against
truck drivers, no such policy conflict would prevent its enforcement against
a branch manager."" To illustrate that such contracts are not offensive
to the public policy of Florida, Justice Drew cited Section 542.12118 of
the Florida Statutes (admittedly not applicable at the date the United
Loan contract was consummated).
The second case, Wynne v. Ludman Corp.,1 merely reaffirmed the
well-established principle that an employee cannot maintain an action
for breach of his employment contract, where the contract is terminable
by the employer at will.
Unlawful employment of minors. The court decided two cases in
which the laws governing the employment of minors 20 were in issue.
In Winn-Lovett Tampa v. Murphree'2' an unlawfully employed minor
attempted to sue his employer, in an ordinary tort action, for injuries
received while on the job. The court held that, in spite of the rule
holding Workmen's Compensation optional, that the minor's exclusive
remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The court reasoned
116. 118 Fla. 137, 130 So. 32 (1934).
117. Justice Drew quoted at length from Thompson v. Shell Petroleum Corp.,
130 Fla. 652, 178 So. 413 (1938), in which the court indicated that the enforcibility
of an agreement not to compete would depend on the equality of bargaining power of
the contracting parties. If this test had been applied in the United Loan case, a dif-
ferent result might readily be justified. However, on closer examination, the Thompson
case does not seem to afford a strong precedent since it concerned a lease contract for
a gasoline station, and the issue before the court on appeal was confined to the theory
of mutuality of obligation, in the law of contracts.
The court, apparently, did not consider the voluminous and well-settled case law
of other jurisdictions, from which it appears that an agreement not to compete will be
enforced, by injunction if necessary, where the contract terms are reasonable as to dura-
tion, geographic limits, and as to the type of prohibited activity. E.g., Electrical Products
v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941), Friedenthal v. Epsey, 45 Colo. 488,
102 Pac. 280 (1909); May v. Young, 125 Conn. 1, 2 A.2d 385 (1938); Kinney v.
Scarborough Co., 138 Ga. 77, 74 S.E. 772 (1912); Ray v. Bolduc, 140 Me. 103, 34
A.2d 479 (1943); Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 141 AtI. 542 (1928).
118. This section reads, in part:
I I . one who is employed as an agent or employee may agree with his
employer, to refrain from u2:.-ying on or engaging in a similar business
and from soliciting old customers of such employer within a reasonably
limited time and area . . . Said agreement may, in the discretion of a
court of competent jurisdiction be enforced by injunction.
119. 79 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1955).
120. FLA. STAT. § 450.011 - 450.171 (1953).
121. 73 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1954), noted in 9 MIAMi L. Q. 111 (1954).
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that the ". . . act is implicit in every employer-employee relationship,
irrespective of the employment or age of the parties .... 122
A not-too-difficult problem in statutory interpretation was presented
by Hunter v. Bullington.123  Section 743.03 of the Florida Statutes
124
removes the common law disabilities of married female minors. On the
other hand, Section 450.071 prohibits the employment of minors (with
certain exceptions) where alcoholic beverages are sold, ". . . whether
such person's disabilities of nonage have been removed by marriage or
otherwise. . . ." The case arose when a married female minor brought
suit for a declaratory decree that she could legally serve alcoholic beverages.
In spite of the seemingly unambiguous language of Section 450.071, the
Circuit Court entered a decree favorable to the plaintiff. On appeal, the
court hold that "The prohibition [of Section 450.071] could hardly be
clearer or more specific. ."125 and reversed the Circuit Court.
FEDrAL CAsES
In this section we have included cases decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and by the United States District
Courts in Florida, where the issue appears to be of local interest. Three
subdivisions have been made: (a) cases arising under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938; (b) cases arising under the Federal Employers
Liability Act and the Federal Safety Appliance Act: (3) miscellaneous
federal cases.
a) Under the Fair Labor Standards Act
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was called
upon to decide four cases, originating in Florida, under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938120 providing minimum wages, maximum hours, and
regulating other conditions of employment in industries engaged in interstate
commerce.
Chapman v. Durkin,127 and Fort Mason Fruit Co. v. Durkin128 were
suits brought by the Secretary of Labor to enjoin two fruit companies from
allegedly violating certain provisions 129 of the Act, relating to minimum
wages. The companies claimed the general exemption which the Act
extends to farmers and agricultural workers, and in particular relied on
the following language:
122. Id. at 291.
123. 74 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1954).
124. The significant portion of this statute reads:
. . The disabilities of nonage of all female minors who are married,
who have been married . .. are removed.
125. 74 Sa.2d 673 (Fla. 1954) at 673.
126. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938) as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1952).
127. 214 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954).
128. 214 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1954).
129. In particular, See. 3(f) of the Act.
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... [exempted from the Act is:] ... farming in all its branches . . .
and any practices . . . perforned by a farmer or on a farm
as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations,
including preparation for market, delivery to storage or to market
or to carriers for transportation to market. 130 (Italics supplied)
Thle companies pointed out that the workers in question were engaged
in hauling fruit from various farms to the fruit company depot, and would
seem to fall squarely within the above exemption. However, the court
ruled against the fruit companies, reasoning that, even though the type
of work was exempt, the companies were not themselves "farmers." 131
A similar situation was presented in Budd v. Mitchell,132 where the
Secretary of Labor sought an injunction against the alleged violation of
the Act by three tobacco processors. 13 Here the workers were employed
in a tobacco "packing house" where the cured leaf was brought after the
individual farmers primed it and dried it in their own barns. The packing
houses were either owned by the farmers jointly, or by a large produce
(such as the King Edward Tobacco Company) who owned the farms,
packing houses, barns, and manufacturing plants. The lower court held
that "the farming exemption ends when the tobacco reaches the receiving
platform of the packing house. .... ,1354 and that the packing house em-
ployees were not exempt from the Act.135 The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision, reasoning that ". . . the work of the packing house employees,
in the preparation for market of the leaf grown exclusively on their own
farms, constitutes 'practices performed by a farmer as an incident to or
in conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for
market .... ' "
Unlike the last two cases, Mitchell v. Royal Baking Company36 turned
on a jurisdictional question, namely, whether or not the defendant was
engaged in the "production of goods for commerce" within the meaning
of the Act. As before, the suit was brought by the Secretary of Labor to
enjoin violations of the Act. The defendant was shown to have an annual
business exceeding one million dollars, and furnished $57,500 of baked
goods annually to two cafeterias which, in turn, sold one third of this
amount to airlines for consumption on flights leaving the state. As might
130. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 203(f)(1952).
131. 214 F.2d at 361.
132. 221 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1955), reversing Durkin v Budd, 114 F.Supp 865
(N.D. Fla. 1953).
133. The defendants were 1. T. Budd Jr. and Company ,the King Edward Tobacco
Company of Florida, and the May Tobacco Company, Intervenor.
134. 114 F. Supp. 865, 868 (N.D. Fla. 1953).
135. Clauses (6) and (10) of § 213(a) of the Act exempt cmployccs engaged in
the handling, storing, etc., of agricultural products for market.
136. 219 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1955).
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be expected, the court had little difficulty in justifying 37 its holding that
the defendant's activities brought it within the coverage of the Act.
b) Under the Federal Employer's Liability Act
Four cases' 35 arose during this survey period involving the Federal
Employer's Liability Act,"' or the Federal Safety Appliance Act. 4 ' Since
these cases concern general tort liability rather than local labor law, we do
not believe they merit detailed discussion here.
c) Miscellaneous federal cases
A decision of some interest was Matter of Florida East Coast Railway
Co., " in which the District Court was faced with a conflict between the
Railway Labor Act 42 (which permits "union shop" contracts to be en-
forced against all employees) and the Florida Constitution (which prohibits
union -and closed-shop agreements). The court followed the prevailing
view,14 3 that such a conflict between state and federal law must be resolved
against the state.
A rather unusual case was Pelicer v. Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks.'4 4  Here, a group of railway employees brought suit
against the union to enjoin execution of a recent amendment to their
collective bargaining agreement. The amendment "integrated" white and
colored employees for the purpose of determining seniority rights, and,
when put into effect, would reduce the seniority of the plaintiffs by co-
mingling them with the colored old-timers. It was their contention that
the amendment was illegal since it was contrived for the "sole benefit of
colored employees."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court decision1 45 (which
had dismissed the suit) holding that the amendment "did not amount to
a discrimination against white employees, but merely rectified an existing
discrimination against the colored employees, the effect of which as to
137. The court relied specifically on Boiscau v. Mitchell, 218 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.
1954); Steward-Jordan Distributing Co. v. Tobin, 210 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1954);
Rolland v. United States, 200 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1953).
138. Martin v. Black, 221 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955); Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v.
Anderson, 221 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1955); Seaboard Air Line R. R. v. Strickland, 80
So.2d 914 (Fla. 1955); Martin v. Johnson, 79 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1955).
139. 35 STAT 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 - 60 (1952).
140. 36 STAT. 298 (1910), 45 U.S.C. §§ 11 - 24 (1952).
141. CCH Lab cas. 67,806 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 1953),
142. 44 STAT. 577 (1926) as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1952).
143. The authority relied on by the court was: Int'l Union UAW v. O'Brien, 339
U.S. 454 (1950); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Re]. Bd., 330 U.S. 767
(1947); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), rehearing denied, 326 U.S. 804 (1945);
Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927).
144, 217 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1954). affirning Pelicer v. Brotherhood of Railway
and Steamship Clerks, 118 F.Supp. 254 (S.D. Fla. 1953).
145. Id.
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the former was damnurn absque iniuria."'14 The court also quoted with
approval the following remarks of the District judge:
. . . it would indeed "turn the blade inward" were this court to
hold invalid and unlawful that which appears to be a good faith
effort . . . to comply with pronouncements of the Supreme Court
in racial discrimination cases.
An appeal from an NLRB ruling,14? arising from a Florida labor
dispute, may be found in NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 ' but
the case merely turns on the weight of the evidence and presents no
significant question of substantive law.
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
In its 1955 session, the Florida Legislature made only one change
in the statutes dealing specifically with labor organizations, namely the
correction of a word in Section 447.13. This section used to read:
Right to strike preserved.-All as specifically provided in this
chapter, nothing shall be construed so as to interfere with or
diminish in any way the right to strike ....
Chapter 29615 of the 1955 Session Laws changed the word "all" to
"except." The effect of this change can, of course, but be surmised, until
"before-and-after" decisions are available for comparison. However, from
the standpoint of English grammar, the word "except" seems more
appropriate, assuming that the intent of the Legislature is to be more
acurately shown by its most recent utterances.
The legislature acted in three other places to govern the activities of
employers and employees, but the changes do not directly affect the law of
labor-management relations.
Chapter 29731 requires employers, labor unions, or associations, which
hold group insurance policies to apply any dividends, premium refunds,
rate reductions, or service fees they may receive for the sole benefit of
their members or employees, without individual selection or discrimination.
Florida Statutes Section 215.19 (1953), which governed the wage rates
of employees on public works contracts, was extensively amended by
Chapter 29783 of the new Sessions Laws. The major changes were: 1) a
new provision requiring that any solicitation for a bid on a public works
contract must draw the attention of the bidder to the provisions of this
section; 2) the addition of a section requiring each contractor to include
with each request for payment a statement that the requirements of this
116. 217 F.2d at 207.
147. See note 148 infra.
148. 222 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1955) reversing Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 108
N.L.R.B. 456 (1954).
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Act had been complied with; 3) a clause requiring the Florida Industrial
Commission to make a continuing study of prevailing wages in various
parts of the state, and to make wage-rate schedules publicly available;
4) a provision for judicial review of the Florida Industrial Commission's
decision on any dispute.
Chapter 29948 is a brand-new act which provides that trust funds
held for the benefit of employees or self-employed persons shall not be
subject to the Rule against Perpetuities, or be held invalid as violating the
laws against suspension of the power of alienation of property.
CONCLUSION
The Florida courts and the Florida legislature have affirmitively shown
their continued inability to cope adequately with modern labor problems.
The lack of a state Labor Board was again made distressingly evident by the
hotel strike litigation. For example, the "majority vote" clause14 in the
Florida Labor Organizations Act (requiring that a lawful strike be authorized
by a majority vote of the employees) may be sound law, but it has been
utterly emasculated by (a) the failure of the legislature to provide adminis-
trative machinery for its enforcement; (b) the failure of the Florida Su-
preme Court to recognize mastership proceedings for its enforcement;' 0
(c) by the holding of the Supreme Court that its provisions apply only to
strikes as distinguished from picketing. 15'
Intervention by the federal government in the hotel strike seems quite
likely to occur, and possibly will be followed by federal intervention in othe
Florida labor litigation. Those who dislike this possibility should recall
that most instances of federal intervention or preemption have been pre-
ceded by affirmative examples of the inadequacy of local government.
149. ILA. SAr. § 447.09(3)(1953).
150. Thomas Jefferson Iic., v. Hotel Employees Union, Local 255, AFL, Sl So.2d
731 (Fla. 1955).
151. See note 39 supra, and the related text.
